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This thesis examines civil-military relations during the critical moments of the 
Czechoslovak history, particularly during the deep political and societal crises in 1938, 
1948, 1968, and 1989. Such a method offers an opportunity to analyze civilian control of 
the military under a situation when the civil-military relations are in deep crisis. By 
concluding that even under such conditions there were stable civil-military relations in 
former Czechoslovakia, this thesis affirms the theory of military professionalism as a 
crucial factor in civil-military relations, as presented by Samuel P. Huntington. Thus, the 
study of civil-military relations in crises of the Czechoslovak history provides an 
exceptional opportunity to test the Huntington’s model of the equilibrium of objective 
civilian control in the circumstances of profound societal disturbances. In accordance 
with the Huntington’s theory of stable civil-military relations, this thesis attests that a 
strong military professionalism, typified by the bonds of traditions, obedience, and 
patriotic loyalty, plays crucial role in determining stability of civil-military relations, i.e. 
an objective civilian control of the military. Subsequently, by following this reasoning 
this thesis also justifies assumption of permanently stable civil-military relations in 
Czechia, because it intentionally concentrates only on the continuum of the Czechoslovak 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
This thesis examines civil-military relations during the critical moments of the 
Czechoslovak history, particularly during the deep political and societal crises in 1938, 
1948, 1968, and 1989. The presented study focuses on these events because they provide 
a unique opportunity to study civilian control of the military under circumstances when 
the civil-military relations in a relatively compact society are highly strung, if not on the 
edge of collapse. By concluding that even under such conditions there were always stable 
civil-military relations in former Czechoslovakia, the study affirms the theory of military 
professionalism as a crucial factor in civil-military relations, as presented by Samuel P. 
Huntington.1 Consequently, by following this reasoning the thesis also justifies 
assumption of permanently stable civil-military relations in Czechia.  
In order to narrow down the topic this thesis examines the problems of 
Czechoslovak civil-military relations only from the Czech point of view, as the Czechs 
were the dominant nation in Czechoslovakia from its origin in 1918 until the Czech-
Slovak dissociation resulting in the peaceful split of Czechoslovakia into two successor 
states, Czechia and Slovakia, on January 1, 1993.2  Also, the Czechs has fully identified 
themselves with the Czechoslovak heritage and the Czech military fully embraces the 
traditions of the Czechoslovak military professionalism; hence, the continuity in civil-
military relations has never been disrupted.3  
The situation seems to be more complicated in Slovakia, as the Slovaks generally 
resisted their somewhat subordinated status in the bi-national Czechoslovakia. The 
different attitudes of both nations seem to originate in long-separate historical 
experiences from times when both nations were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
While “by accident of geographic location, the Czech lands fell to the more economically 
 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, renewed edition, 1985), 7-18.  
2 William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 477. 
3 This is the reason that the terms Czechoslovak and Czech are used interchangeably for the purpose of 
this thesis.   
2 
developed and nationally tolerant Austrian part of the dual monarchy….Slovaks were 
increasingly subject to the pressures of a government magyarization {Hungarization) 
policy,”T4T which put limitation on nation’s development. Such a historic experience may 
provide historic explanation for “the higher degree of emotionality or over-sensitivity of 
the Slovak national character.”T5T Another complicating factor is the civil-military heritage 
of the first independent Slovak state during World War II and particularly the Slovak 
National Uprising in 1944. According to Jelínek, the uprising saved the element of 
nationalism, which otherwise would have been discredited by the Slovak alliance with 
Nazi Germany.T6T 
The different character of the Slovak civil-military relations seems to be 
documented by the fact that Slovakia’s defense reform was “hampered by political 
instability and fragmentation,”T7T during the first years after gaining independence in 1993. 
Although in recent years Slovaks have managed “to build and maintain stability in the 
ASR [Slovak Armed forces],” T8T which undoubtedly contributed to the Slovak accession to 
NATO in 2004, it is evident that the Slovak military professionalism comes from 
different roots. For this reason, this thesis intentionally concentrates only on the 
continuum of the Czechoslovak and the Czech civil-military relations. 
 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis is important for two basic reasons. First of all, the history of the 
Czechoslovak civil-military relations provides an excellent opportunity to test the 
Huntington’s model of the equilibrium of objective civilian controlT9T in reality, under the 
conditions of deep societal disturbances of different origins and character. The thesis’ 
main idea is based on the general understanding that “there are few more critical factors 
                                                 
T
4
T Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State (Boulder, Col.: Westview 
Press, 1998), 7.  
T
5
T Jiří Musil ed., The End of Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press), 139. 
T
6
T Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism, Slovakia, and the Communists 1918-1948 
(Boulder: East European Monographs, 1983), 75.  
T
7
T Jeffrey Simon, NATO and the Czech & Slovak Republics: a Comparative Study in Civil-Military 
Relations (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2004), 238. 
T
8
T Ibid., 248. 
T
9
T Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 94. 
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in the stability of civilian government than the relationship between the professional 
military and the society it serves. Paradoxically, an efficient and cohesive military is at 
once a guarantor of regime security and a potential threat to civilian rule.”10 Thus, the 
study of the civil-military relations in crises of Czechoslovak history provides an 
exceptional testing environment, because “the most important causes of military 
intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and 
organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and 
institutional structure of the society.”11  Furthermore, the mentioned crises are quite 
different in their nature and they are separated in time by a decade or two; hence, this 
phenomenon provides natural conditions that are similar to a controlled experiment, 
because in such a situation it is possible to test the changes in civil-military relations on 
the background of radical and often turbulent societal developments. 
Secondly, owing to the fact that this thesis is intentionally limited to a single 
nation and the developmental continuity of the Czechoslovak and the Czech society in 
the span of 50 years, it also allows to evaluate and estimate the further developments of 
the Czech civil-military relations. This effect originates from the fact that, culturally, the 
Czechoslovak heritage is a key determinant of the Czech civil-military relations. 
Secondly, the institutional memory of military organizations tends to be long and 
conservative, as “conservatism is basically similar to the military ethic…. [because 
conservatism] is not driven by its own logic to an inevitable conflict with the military 
values which stem from the demands of the military function.”12 Therefore, the historical 
evidence of a military professionalism and a firm civilian control of the military is also 
important for the present and future civil-military relations in Czechia. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY  
In order to find a credible explanation for the absence of any involvement of the 
military in the modern Czechoslovak politics, this thesis employs a single case study, 
 
10 Condoleezza Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983: Uncertain Allegiance 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), xi. 
11 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968), 194.  
12 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 93. 
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where the constant output of the Czechoslovak civil-military relations is tested against 
dramatically changing societal environment in the span of more than seven decades. 
Internal and external threats should be considered as important condition determining 
factors, as they form extreme cases of security challenges, which consequently test the 
relationship between the society and its military force as the military has strong 
incentives to step into politics. Because this thesis only aspires to come up with a specific 
explanation in the frame of the general theory of the military professionalism as a crucial 
factor in civil-military relations, the inherent weakness of a single case study, i.e. the fact 
that “the data is unrandomized and partial correlations are infeasible, since the data points 
are too few,”13 is irrelevant for this “within-case” study. 
Bibliographically, this thesis is based on both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources are basically composed of historical sources, describing in detail the 
reaction of the Czechoslovak military in the critical moments of the Czechoslovak 
(Czech) history, thus providing evidence of the civilian control in the most strenuous 
moments of civil-military relations. The secondary resources include works providing 
theoretical background and a broader explanation for the historically proved phenomenon 
of strong civilian control of the military in Czechoslovakia (Czechia). 
   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This thesis is organized in the following way. Chapter II explains the basic 
theories of civil-military relations, which are needed in order to interpret the output of the 
Czechoslovak civil-military relations in the studied crises. This modus operandi begins 
with the theory of military professionalism, as a principal theory explaining why a highly 
professional officer corps stays loyal to its civilian leadership even in a situation when 
civil-military relations are most vulnerable. Consequently, this theory is applied on the 
Czechoslovak case, as it explains the historical roots of the Czechoslovak military 
professionalism. Chapter II then reveals the importance of the threat environment, 
because under a specific threat situation an internal societal stability may rapidly   
deteriorate so the possibility of a military coup d'état becomes imminent, as the military 
 
13 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 51. 
5 
officers usually feel it is their patriotic duty to save the nation from the looming chaos. 
Finally, Chapter II also depicts the two-dimensional theory of party-military relations. 
This theory is crucial for understanding how civil-military relations are altered under the 
conditions of a one-party totalitarianism, which applies for the period of the 
Czechoslovak communist regime, i.e. the crises in 1968 and 1989.  
Chapter III analyzes in detail the 1938, 1948, 1968, and 1989 crises, using them 
as testing moments of the Czechoslovak civil-military relations. It compares the 
similarities and differences among these crises with special regard to the levels of internal 
and external security threats. Although each of these crises was caused by different 
historic and threat factors, the result was always a deep societal crisis, different in its 
origins but in all cases threatening the basic survival of a society. Chapter III then 
examines the reaction of the Czechoslovak military leaders in the most perilous moments 
of the crises’ developments, which in fact equaled to the window of opportunity for a 
military coup. In this process, there have been found certain preparations for a military 
intervention into politics, but these were ill-prepared and more like a desperate attempts. 
Generally, the Czechoslovak military leadership has always bowed to its political 
representation, however serious consequences this approach had for the society as well as 
the military itself.  
Chapter IV concludes that the compliance of the Czechoslovak military with the 
decisions of civilian authorities, even in the most critical moments of the Czechoslovak 
history, provides solid evidence of the firm civilian control of the Czechoslovak military 
under all circumstances. This fact has dual effect; first of all, the study’s findings affirm 
the validity of military professionalism as a crucial factor in civil-military relations. 
Secondly, these findings also give reasons to assume permanently stable civil-military 
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II. THEORETHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
A. MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AS A CRUCIAL FACTOR 
The fist theoretical point of departure for the study of the Czechoslovak civil-
military relation is represented by the theory of military professionalism, as put forward 
by Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington believes that the relationship between the society 
and its military is principally determined by an antagonistic interaction of the societal and 
functional imperatives. This interaction configurates the military professional culture and 
therefore, it also determines the military loyalty to its civilian leadership. From this point 
of view it is impossible to reach stable civil-military relations without balancing 
successfully the functional element, i.e. security guarantees, with the societal one, i.e. 
ideological and societal powers.  
As he further elaborates on this theory, Huntington comes to his conclusion that 
“the principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the 
state. [because] Here the conflict between functional and societal pressures comes to a 
head. ”14  This reasoning highlights the officer corps as the vital decision-making element 
within military structures; hence, it also explains why the professional military culture 
corresponds with the independent variable of this thesis, primarily determining the output 
of the Czechoslovak civil-military relations. 
This way of thinking brings Huntington to the focal point of his theory, which 
may be described as a cause and effect relationship that works according the following 
line: “autonomy [of soldier as experts in the management of violence] leads to 
professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which 
leads to secure civilian control. The heart his concept is the putative link between 
professionalism and voluntary subordination.”15 In other words, under the conditions of a 
constant threat environment, a professional military officer corps voluntarily complies 
with the political guidance, because it is required by the principles of their professional 
culture. If military authorities do not obey civilian leaders, then they are virtually 
 
14 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 3.  
15 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 18. 
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contravening their professional ethics by getting involved into politics and thus, they are 
also losing the professional credit for their autonomous management of violence. 
The origins of the Czechoslovak (Czech) military professionalism can be tracked 
to the years of World War I, which directly preceded to the establishment of the modern 
Czechoslovak state in 1918. By then the Czechs and Slovaks were part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire for almost four centuries. During this period both nations managed to 
keep distinctive national character, but they were also showing general acceptance for 
Austro-Hungarian rule, because the monarchy provided them with relatively stable 
political and economic environment.  This explains relatively high number of Czech and 
Slovak officers in the Habsburg military, which was basically proportionate to the Czech 
and Slovak share on the overall general population. One reason for such a development 
was that “throughout its history, the Habsburg army was publicly and actively opposed to 
any manifestation of nationalism. It recruited its officers from all the provinces of the 
monarchy….[and] Officers born in German-Austria were not grossly overrepresented.”16 
Secondly, during the last decades of the empire both nations, but especially the Czech 
lands, were experiencing a prolonged period of political and economic stability, as “the 
Habsburg monarchy had never known such a long period of peace as that between 1867 
and 1914.”17  
However, the fact that Czech and Slovak soldiers never fully identified 
themselves with the multinational monarchy dominated by the Austrians and the 
Hungarians became clear during the later stages of World War I. The war fully exposed 
that “the Dual Monarchy could not reform itself sufficiently to blunt the [principal] 
challenge,”18 i.e. the lack of an adequate political representation for all nationalities 
within the Austro-Hungarian multinational concept. 1917 and 1918 Hence, the military 
performance of the Czechoslovak troops on the side of Central powers became 
significantly poor in 1917 and 1918, “when the monarchy’s population was suffering 
from hunger, the war economy was in decline, and desertions and revolutionary 
 
16 István Deák, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 
1848-1918  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 183-4. 
17 Ibid., 60. 
18 Hew Strachan, ed. The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 24. 
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nationalist and socialist agitation was rampant.”19 Indeed, “it must have been frustration 
and exasperation that drove entire battalions of Czechs…to surrender….In fact, the 
dissolution of the monarchy into hostile national entities had begun in the POW 
camps.”20 Those who stayed in the Austro-Hungarian military were frequently using acts 
of passive resistance similar to the way in which the hero “ably depicted by J. Hašek in 
‘Good Soldier Švejk,’ often pursued his skirmishing with monarchist, mostly German-
speaking army.”21  
Undoubtedly, the key factor in the development of the Czechoslovak military 
professionalism was the establishment of the Czechoslovak legions in France, Italy and 
Russia in the final stage of the Great War. This voluntary force, created from volunteers 
among the Czech and Slovak émigrés, prisoners of war, and defectors from the Austro-
Hungarian military, was extremely important, because as a first national military force 
after four centuries it literally set up the hierarchy of military values, as the frame for the 
new Czechoslovak (Czech) military ethics. This way, the legions has laid base for the 
Czechoslovak (Czech) military professionalism. In its final impact on civil-military 
relations, this process seems to be similar to the Huntington’s explanation of the Prussian 
military traditions as a key element of the institutional professionalism in the German 
military.22  
Although all Czechoslovak legions were distinguishable by high morale and 
strong discipline, the military performance of the legions in France and Italy was largely 
symbolic, as these units were relatively small so they could not reach any decisive 
military break-through. Though, the situation was completely different in the east, where, 
after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Czechoslovak legions for some time 
represented the most viable military force, as described by Korbel:   
The Czechoslovak legion, whose numbers varied according to changing 
circumstances from 40,000 to 70,000 men, was the only organized, 
seasoned force in the chaos of revolutionary Russia….the separate peace  
19 Deák, 192. 
20 Ibid., 197-8. 
21 Anton A. Bebler, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Post Communist States: Central and Eastern 
Europe in Transition (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 93. 
22 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 99-100. 
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negotiated at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 frustrated the Legionaries’ 
plans to fight the Germans on the Eastern front. Expecting to join the 
French Army on the Western front, they embarked on an apparently 
fantastic action; the transport of units from the Ukraine, across Siberia, to 
Vladivostok, from which they would cross the Pacific Ocean, the 
continental United States, and the Atlantic Ocean to reach France. Only a 
small group of legionaries made the journey. Most of them, however, were 
fighting against Bolsheviks in the Russian civil war, an action which made 
them famous and popular in all Allied capitals. They returned to their 
homeland eighteen months after the armistice ending World War I was 
signed at Compiègne.23
Hence, it is not surprising that after the independent Czechoslovakia was created 
in 1918 the core of the Czechoslovak military was being formed from legionaries. By the 
same token, their moral principles and values became key principles regulating the 
relations between a political representation and a professional officer corps.  
Important feature of the Czechoslovak military professionalism has been its civic 
character, which seems to be different to similar German traditions. Indeed, Germans and 
Czechoslovaks were probably the only nations in Central and Eastern Europe that 
managed to go through extremely turbulent periods of its modern history without 
resorting to some form of a military coup. According to Huntington, the German 
professionalism to a certain extent reflects the Junker ideals, which are “highly 
conservative and sympathetic to military viewpoint.”24 Karl Demeter notes that the 
German officer corps is distinguishable by their professional or social standing.25 
Although the German officer corps has gone through many sweeping changes, the fact 
that “it possessed a solid core, compounded of conviction and tradition”26 has always 
mattered, which explains why Huntington asserts that even during the most dramatic 
moments of the German history, German officers “were not trying to act as political 
figures; they were escaping from politics….They were trying to behave like professional 
 
23 Josef Korbel, Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 
32. 
24 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 103. 
25 Karl Demeter, The German Officer Corps in Society and State 1650-1945, trans. Angus Malcolm 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd., 1965), 3.   
26 Ibid., 253. 
11 
soldiers.”T27T  The dark side of such an approach was that under the Nazi rule, “they could 
not destroy the evil in the environment without violating that creed and destroying the 
good in themselves. Their glory and their tragedy was that they adhered to their faith until 
obliterated by the holocaust.”T28T  For similar reasons, “the coup rate of 20Pth P of July 1944 
gave the world the first glimpse of moral and political dilemma [of German officers],” T29T 
because the high professional standards of German military, securing the military’s 
loyalty to the “civilian” Nazi rulers, were in reality contributing to the destruction of the 
German nation. 
In contrast with the German model, the Czechoslovak (Czech) professionalism 
does not embrace ideals of a particular societal group. Instead, it traditionally emphasizes 
superiority of education and learning as a necessary attribute of achieving the status of a 
military professional as a citizen in uniform. This fact may be documented by the 
observation of Bruce Lockhart, a British diplomat stationed in Moscow in the period after 
the Bolshevik revolution. As he commented on the Czechoslovak legionaries, he 
“admired their stupendous performance and extolled their magnificent spirit and 
wonderful discipline. He attributed their excellence to their high level of education and 
observed that the Legion was composed of ‘men of intellectual class’.”T30T The legionaries 
were perceived in the society as “the men who did their most difficult duty during the 
most difficult times,”T31T because they fought for their country in World War I even if they 
did not know whether they would have any country after the war. Had Austro-Hungary 
survived the war as a state, which could not be fully excluded in the course of war, the 
legionaries would have been labeled as “traitors.” This explains why the newly 
established Czechoslovak military fully embraced the moral values and spiritual heritage 
of the legions.  
                                                 
27 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 122. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Demeter, vii. 
30 John O. Crane and Sylvia Crane. Czechoslovakia: Anvil of the Cold War, with a foreword by 
Corliss Lamont. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 35. 
31 Eduard Beneš. Armáda, brannost národa a obrana státu (Military, National Security and Defense) 
(Prague: Svaz Čs. důstojnictva,  1937), 64. 
12 
                                                
Consequently, legionary ethos determined the role of the professional military in 
the society, as formulated by President Eduard Beneš in his speech to the graduates of the 
Czechoslovak Military War College on June 22, 1936: “For and officer of your category, 
it is necessary to have high military culture…by combining the talent of a soldier-expert 
with the separate gift of a high spirit and general culture….A military officer must also 
understand all aspects of our political and public life.”32 The civic concept was so deeply 
rooted in the military professional culture that although during the era of Marxist 
totalitarianism the Czechoslovak communists tried hard to eradicate this concept and 
replace it with a Marxist military ideology; they never fully succeeded in their effort to 
suppress the civic elements in the Czechoslovak military culture.  
The civic nature of the Czechoslovak military professionalism provides 
explanation for the remarkable acceptance of supremacy of civilian authorities among the 
Czechoslovak officers. Generally, civil-military relations tend to be tense in time of 
societal crises and disorders, because military professionals feel obliged to save their 
country even if it goes against the authority of civilian political leaders. In the crises of 
Czechoslovak history, the military, with the exception of isolated incidents described in 
chapter III, showed complete compliance with the decisions of the civilian leadership. 
This had to be especially difficult in the 1938 and 1968 crises, because “political 
decisions resulting in the loss of state sovereignty were erroneously ascribed by the 
Czech public to the failures of the military. The political tradition of giving up without a 
fight has been used by many as the ultimate proof of the Czech military’s utter 
uselessness,”33 However, by the same token the military’s compliance with civilian 
guidelines, even at the expense of the moral military prestige, proves the high degree of 
the Czechoslovak military professionalism. Even under the communist regime, after the 
democratic civil-military relations were replaced by the communist party – military 
relations,  “the  Czechoslovak  military leadership always dutifully followed …consigns  
 
32 Beneš. Armáda, brannost národa a obrana státu, 41. 
33 Bebler ed., 94. 
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and limitations. The top brass influenced political and social developments in communist 
Czechoslovakia to much lesser degree than elsewhere in communist-dominated 
countries.”34  
In summary, the history of Czechoslovak civil-military relations seems to 
conform to the Huntington’s theory emphasizing the crucial role of a military 
professionalism for the resulting state of civil military relations, because true military 
professionals fully understand their role in the society and never intervene into politics. 
Particularly in the Czechoslovak case, the traditional civic concept of military 
professionalism seems to be what prevented the Czechoslovak officers from seizing 
political power during the most disturbing periods of the nation’s history.    
 
B. THE IMPACT OF A THREAT ENVIRONMENT  
Next to the military professionalism, the threat environment is another crucial 
aspect of this study. In accordance with the Michael C. Desch’s structural theory of civil-
military relations, threats, either external or internal, should be considered as conditioning 
phenomena, because their important effect is “general politicization of social forces and 
institutions,”35 including the armed forces, thus they may also create favorable conditions 
for a military intervention into civilian matters, because military officers usually have a 
tendency to act independently from a civilian authority if they think this approach is 
necessary to save their threatened nation. 
The principal argument that Desch brings forward is that “the strength of civilian 
control of the military in most countries is shaped fundamentally by structural factors, 
especially threats, which affect individual leaders, the military organization, the state, and 
society.” 36 Further, Desch deducts that different structural threat environments have 
direct impact on “the convergence and divergence of civilian and military views of the 
 
34 Bebler ed., 94. 
35 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 194. 
36 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security environment 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 11. 
societal situation;37 therefore, the threats are crucial in determining whether the military 
as an institution will become “a serious contender for control of a society.”38
The relationship between the strength of civilian control of the military and the 
structural threat environment is illustrated on Figure 1. Desch argues that high external 
and low internal threats (equal to quadrant Q1) should create the most stable civil-
military relations, because the external challenge is likely to amalgamate the nation for 
self-defense. The absence of an internal threat enables that society is united and in order 
to counter a serious external threat it needs to mobilize fully against the external 
adversary. Therefore, as Desch deducts, such a situation strengthens intra-societal 
cohesion, hence it also strengthens the relationship and mutual support between military 
organizations and civilian structures.39
 
Figure 1.   Civilian Control of the Military as a function of Location and Intensity of 
Threats.40  
External threats 
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On the opposite side of the same spectrum is a state which faces low external and 
high internal threats, which results in the weakest civilian control of the military (Fig.1, 
Q4). Because “in such a situation, civilian institutions are also likely to be weak and 
deeply divided,”41 it obviously makes military more likely to intervene in politics for 
patriotic reason to “save the nation” from internal chaos. 
Desch openly admits that the cases of low external and low internal threats (Fig.1, 
Q2) as well as the cases of high external and high internal threats (Fig.1, Q3) are the most 
complicated, because under such conditions states usually face indeterminated threat 
environments.42 A situation like that may produce different outputs, depending on 
particular cultural and historical settings; however, Desch asserts that we should expect 
low-level civil-military conflicts to emerge in Q2 circumstances, stemming from the 
internal divisions and rifts among different fractions within the society. By the same 
token, there is a possibility of internal tensions within the civilian society in Q4 
circumstances, resulting in a volatile situation, which may cause internal collapse of civil-
military relations and make the military incapable to counter external threats.43  
Under all circumstances, the existence of a high external threat to an internally 
consolidated society strengthens civil-military relations, because it causes the affect of 
“rallying ‘round the flag.”44 One example of this kind seems to be the empirical fact that 
in the history of modern warfare military missions targeting civilian population in order 
to demoralize civilians and cause a rift between the military and civilians have never 
succeeded. For example, during the Battle of England in WW II, “though German 
bombing raids killed 51,509 British civilians and damaged or destroyed one out of five 
British homes, they did not produce the widespread demoralization and civil unrest that 
the theorists of strategic bombing…had predicted.”45 Similar pattern of counter 
productive effect of increased military threat against civilian population, resulting in 
rapidly improved civilian-military relations of the adversary, may be tracked in other 
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events of World War II, for example in the Allied bombing of German cities or the 
German siege of Leningrad. Therefore, it may be possible to generalize the Overy’s 
observation from the Battle of Britain in Desch’s terms, that increased external threat 
usually results in civilian population being “galvanized” behind its leaders and fully 
supporting their military.46
From this viewpoint of Desch’s theory, Czechoslovak civil-military relations are 
somewhat specific. Although two out of the four crises of the Czechoslovak history that 
are the subjects of this study two were caused by external threats (1938 and 1968), in 
both cases the impact on the society was a severe internal political crisis, which created 
strong incentives for the military to step in and intervene into civilian matters. Such an 
effect creates a specific case where external threats are multiplying existing internal 
divisions within the society, thus, the resulting effect is to significant extent similar to the 
impact of internal threats, because in this case the external pressures are quickly 
transformed into severe internal threats. In other words, even if the society appears stable 
and consolidated, the sudden emergence of an external threat can quickly throw it off 
balance by uncovering hidden internal conflicts. Therefore, the Desch’s classification of 
threat impact does not seem to be relevant for Czechoslovak civil-military crises. 
To sum up, although the relevance of the threat environment as a conditioning 
factor is enormously important because an extreme threat may create enormous 
incentives for a military intervention into politics, in the Czechoslovak case the output 
from extreme levels of external and internal threats seems to be the same, i.e. a deep 
societal crisis, including a severe crisis in civil-military relations. This seems to be caused 
by the fact that internal and external threats are somewhat intermingled and it is really 
difficult to distinguish between these two categories. This reasoning was principal for the 
selection of cases for this study of Czechoslovak civil-military relations; that is why it is 
irrelevant in this thesis whether the presented crises were caused by internal or external 
factors. Either way, the crises that are being studied in this thesis are distinguishable by  
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extreme threat levels; therefore, as the most tumultuous moments of the Czechoslovak 
history, they can be suitably used to test the efficacy of the civilian control of the 
military.      
 
C. IMPORTANCE OF PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS  
Under the conditions of East European communist-led totalitarian regimes, a 
specific problem of the civil-military relations was the quality and configuration of party-
military relations. Condoleezza Rice emphasizes that in order to examine civil-military 
relations in such circumstances, “there is a need to suggest a framework which delineates 
the important features of the East European party-military relationship, identifies the 
major actors and posits the relationship between the actors.”47 Therefore, for the purpose 
of this thesis, the Czechoslovak party-military relations represent another set of 
intervening variables.  
Although East block satellites commonly tried to copy the Soviet model of civil-
military relations, they failed to reach similar results. Thus, Rice argues that while in the 
former Soviet Union the military had become fully integrated into the political system in 
which the communist party and the military shared a common “stake in the stability of 
the USSR, [because] this shared interest in the status quo had engendered considerable 
rapprochement between the communist party and its military,”48 the output in East 
European communist countries was different. Although the model of party-military 
relations was at first sight identical, “the rapprochement…failed to materialize.”49 As a 
result of this phenomenon, the East European militaries, including the Czechoslovak 
armed forces, were plagued by “suspect loyalty, problems of legitimacy and political 
isolation,”50 and  as  such  they remained vulnerable to the temptation of intervening into  
 
47  Condoleezza Rice, “The politics of Client Command: Party-Military Relations in Czechoslovakia: 
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48 Ibid., 15. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
civilian politics, which provides explanation why “the careful separation of civilian and 
military functions characteristic of communist systems did not withstand the strain of the 
crisis of 1981.”51    
In order to address the issue in its whole complexity, Rice has developed a two-
dimensional model of East European party-military relations. The first dimension deals 
with the domestic milieu and describes direct interaction between the party and the 
military, as shown on Fig.2.  
 











                                                
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that Soviet Union was a crucial player 
within the communist block and because of the theory of the theory of communist 
internationalism, the USSR did not much respected the sovereignty of its satellites and 
openly intervened into their internal issues. The Soviet military interventions in Hungary 
(1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) provide strong evidence about its policy of the “Big 
Brother.” That is why Rice brings in the combined model of the first and second 
dimension (Fig.3). Fig.3 shows that an East European military is first of all under the 
control of its domestic communist party, which “relies upon coercive, normative and 
 
51 Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 6. 
52 Ibid, 7.  
utilitarian means,”53 to pursue the goal of effective civilian control of its military. 
Nevertheless, “neither the party nor the military are independent actors in East Europe,”54 
because both of them are subject of the influence and interference of their Soviet 
counterparts. Thus, an East European military is under a direct control of its ruling party 
and, simultaneously, it is also being monitored and  manipulated by the Soviet military, 
to which it reports via the East Bloc chain of command.  
 












                                                
Obviously, even the relationship between the parties is assymetrical and the 
Soviet party always has an upper hand. By using the second dimensional influence, the 
USSR had an important tool of control over its East European allies. In case when a 
ruling party started diverting from the official Marxist line, the Soviet leaders could make 
an attempt to use the military to military connection to change the situation in the 
particular country, which is exactly what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
Theoretically, they could apply the same policy in 1989; the reason that they did not so 
was  that  “the  Soviet  Union,  shaken  by  its  own  economic,  political  and  nationalist  
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problems, was no more a powerful patron for its satellites in 1989;”T 56 T  so there was no 
more interest from the Soviet side to intervene into the internal political crises in 
Czechoslovakia.    
In summary, the second dimensional ties are as important for the final output of 
civil-military relations as the first dimension, and depending on the circumstances the 
second dimension may be determining the party-military relationship, which, under the 
conditions of a communist regime, seems to be the most efficient way of the civilian 
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III. CZECHOSLOVAK CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN 
CRISES 
A. MUNICH CRISIS IN 1938 
The Munich crisis in 1938 represents a case when the Czechoslovak military, 
under efficient democratic control of its civilian leadership, was ready to fight, after it 
had been for twenty years systematically being prepared to defend the nation. 
Consequently, the military was during a single day tasked to change radically the strategy 
and instead of fighting to defend the national territory, the Czechoslovak military was 
ordered to surrender national sovereignty without a fight. Needless to say, such a change 
immediately caused mutual mistrust between the military commanders and political 
leaders, which resulted in a sudden and unexpected crisis in civil-military relations. The 
fact that military in the end obeyed the orders from democratically elected civilian 
administration proves the high level of civilian control of the Czechoslovak military and 
the existence of Czechoslovak military professionalism.      
From the theoretic point of view, the crisis explicitly represents the case of a state 
facing high external and high internal threat with the resulting classification of civilian 
control of the military as poor. However, it is extremely difficult to determine the exact 
level of the internal threat, because it is impossible to evaluate what would have been the 
reaction of the German-speaking population of Czechoslovakia, if Czechoslovak generals 
had seized power in a coup and gone to war with the Nazi Germany.  
Probably the most correct description is a mixture of gradually growing external 
threats that were quickly transformed into severe internal threats. Undoubtedly, the 
external factors were main determinants of the crisis, as they caused deep political crisis 
in the country. Nevertheless, the external factors were also influencing the internal 
situation in Czechoslovakia and vice versa. This evaluation is based on the well 
documented facts that Nazi insurgency on the Czechoslovak frontier was largely 
controlled  from  Nazi  Germany,  internal  policy  of the Czechoslovak government was  
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under enormous pressure from British and French emissaries and the internal 
developments in Czechoslovakia were misused by Nazi propaganda prior to the 
negotiations in Munich.57     
Until September 30, 1938, Czechoslovakia can be recognized as a fully 
democratic country, with efficiently working parliamentarian system, 58 therefore except 
for the insurgent activities of the German Nazis in frontier regions the internal situation 
was relatively stable. The limited influence of Nazi insurgents is clearly visible from their 
failure to stage a widespread Nazi uprising in mid-September 1938. However, this 
situation dramatically changed after September 30, 1938. By accepting the Munich 
agreement, the Czechoslovak government lost all its political credibility and the result 
was a severe internal crisis, which dramatically changed the societal climate. 
International political crisis in 1938, which culminated with the signature of 
Munich agreement on September 30 by top representatives of France, Great Britain, Nazi 
Germany and Italy, also represents a deep crisis in traditional orientation of 
Czechoslovak politicians on cooperation with Western powers, which had been perceived 
as principle guarantors of Czechoslovak statehood.  
The principal mistake, made by the Czechoslovak political leaders in late summer 
1938, was that they fully relied on security guaranties given to Czechoslovakia by Great 
Britain and France, because “they [Czechoslovak political leaders] believed that the 
whole world viewed the Czechoslovak-German crisis as a test of the ability of 
democracies to resist totalitarian manipulation.”59  Thus, they failed to understand the 
two power were not ready to bleed their troops to defend Czechoslovakia’s independence 
Hence, as the crisis started unfolding in July 1938, only few Czechoslovak political 
leaders understood the seriousness of the crisis. One of them was the Minister Mastný, 
who, “analyzed Czechoslovakia’s international situation in the most pessimistic terms. 
One should have no doubts, Mastný warned, about intentions of Adolf Hitler; he was 
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determined to smash Czechoslovakia by one means or another.”T60T However, the majority 
of the Czechoslovak political establishment did not realize that French and British 
governments favored appeasement of the Nazi Germany. Particularly the Czechoslovak 
president Beneš, who was also vested with the authority of the Czechoslovak supreme 
military commander, until the last moments of the crisis, “felt confident that France 
would remain faithful to its obligations.”T61T 
Following the guidance from their civilian leadership, the Czechoslovak military 
was strongly determined to fight. Czechoslovak highest commanders firmly believed they 
were able to defend the nation hence they favored tough opposition against Nazi 
demands. This may be documented by the statement of General Ludvík Krejčí, then the 
chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Army, who on September 9 vociferously warned 
against any “move by leading statesmen which – rightly or wrongly – might convey even 
the semblance of weakness…The army is under impression that all the interminable 
negotiations and humiliations are the result of an over-estimation of the strength of our 
northern neighbor [Nazi Germany] and underestimation of our potential strength.”T62T 
Eduard Beneš, states in his memoirs: “our [Czechoslovak] army, in spite of all 
deficiencies, which I did not conceal from myself, was at the time of Munich discussions, 
one of the best in Europe and that it was fighting fit in its morale as well as in its 
equipment.” T63T When the president speaks about deficiencies he means above all the fact 
the main defensive asset, which was a ring of frontier fortifications similar to the French 
Maginot Line, was still unfinished in 1938. Despite these deficiencies, “the army was 
well equipped; the fortifications were modern; the morale was unmatched. The 
Czechoslovak armaments industry was among the best in the world.”T64T  Some of the 
German high commanders revealed after World War II that the German forces were not 
“strong enough militarily”T65T to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938. Among others, “Field 
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Marshal Wielhelm Keitel and Marshal Fritz von Mannstein candidly admitted at the 
Nuremberg military trials that they did not believe Germany then [in 1938] had the power 
to break through the barrier [of the Czechoslovak fortifications].”66  
Another boost to the morale and self-confidence of Czechoslovak troops occurred 
in two mobilizations in 1938. Fist of all, “the partial mobilization of the Czechoslovak 
army in May [1938] turned, at least for a fleeting moment, into a near triumph for the 
Prague government.”67 As the crisis gradually escalated in September 1938, “there were 
calls for a strong military cabinet to defend the integrity of the [Czechoslovak] state. A 
new cabinet, under General Jan Syrový, was installed and on September 23 a decree of 
general mobilization was issued.”68 The general mobilization transformed into the 
manifestation of national self-consciousness. During the highly organized mobilization 
the Czechoslovak troops deployed into defensive positions on the national borders. After 
the Czechoslovak military fully mobilized, “the [Czechoslovak] republic was properly 
prepared for war.”69  
Last event documenting the preparedness of the Czechoslovak military to war, 
while also proving strong civilian control of the military, was the deployment of the army 
against Nazi insurgents rioting in frontier regions of Czechoslovakia. In reaction to the 
ethnical unrest against non-German citizens in Czechoslovak frontier districts with a 
majority of  German population (Sudetenland), the Czechoslovak military showed great 
restraint as it reinforced law enforcement authorities during the period of a state of 
emergency on 13 and 14 September 1938, as: 
Reinforcements of [Czechoslovak] police officers as well as troops calmly 
marched into areas that had been captured by SdP [Sudeten Nazi Party] 
paramilitary units. When the shooting stopped, the final tally was twenty-
seven dead (sixteen Czechs, eleven Sudeten Germans). This was 
testimony to the discipline and self restraint of the [Czechoslovak] 
authorities, especially if one considers that the Freikops [German 
paramilitaries] were merely groups of illicitly armed civilians who  
66 Crane and Crane, 167. 
67 Lukes, 173. 
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enjoyed no legal standing under Czechoslovak or international law and 
had no protection as combatants under law of war.70
The critical moment in the Czechoslovak civil-military relations came after the 
Munich agreement was signed on 30 September 1938, because by surrendering to Nazi 
Germany at about eleven thousand square miles of national territory including 86 percent 
of its chemical industry, 86 percent of its glass industry, and 70 percent of its iron and 
steel enterprises,71 Czechoslovakia in fact ceased its existence as a sovereign state. 
Consequently, there was a widespread felling of betrayal among Czech population, and 
especially among military officers. The point may be illustrated by the statement of a 
Czechoslovak president’s secretary Drtina, who opinioned that “Czechoslovakia should 
surrender or fight to bitter end. No nation…could lose liberty without struggle, unless it 
was ready to accept moral disintegration.”72   
“The Czechoslovak capitulation precipitated an outburst of national 
indignation.”73 Many blamed the president and the government for the national 
catastrophe, since “in the final analysis, the decision to capitulate was exclusive 
responsibility of the Czechoslovak government.”74 Consequently, in the evening of 30 
September 1938, “crowds on the streets of Prague thundered with anger and frustration”. 
Under this volatile situation many politicians from different parts of the political 
spectrum called upon the military to seize the power, restore the order and defend the 
national integrity against the troops of the Nazi Germany. The Communist leaders were 
particularly active this way. They tried to exploit the situation, with the intention “to 
overthrow the government that had accepted the Munich Diktat [agreement], to mobilize 
the masses, and coordinate the party’s policy with the anticapitulationist elements in the 
Army’s General Staff.”75 The leader of the Czechoslovak Communists, Klement 
Gottwald tried to appeal to a military coup by making an emotional speech in which he 
said: “Barefoot Ethiopians, without arms, defended themselves, and we yield! Look at 
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Spanish people, how they defended themselves! We have a great army; the nation is 
united!...We should demonstrate our strength. It is still not too late. The Munich demands 
should not be tolerated.”76  
Favorably to these attempts to entice the military to seize power, there was a 
widespread disillusionment and bitterness within the military, as majority of the officers 
and non-commissioned troops felt being betrayed by their government. Remarkably, the 
Czechoslovak military stayed loyal to the government, which clearly signals strong 
civilian control of the military, regardless of sharp differences in military and civilian 
ideas. Prime Minister Syrový, who as an army general and a national hero of World War 
I had been held in high esteem among both military and public,77 followed reason and 
calmed down highly running emotions by his statement that “the four powers had given 
Czechoslovakia a choice between being murdered and committing suicide.”78 Thus, his 
position was very close to the opinion of President Beneš, who “had grave doubts about 
the army’s ability to offer meaningful resistance; he believed that resistance was suicidal, 
and he wanted the nation to live.”79 Apparently, the President believed the acceptance of, 
the Munich agreement, however humiliating for moral consciousness of the nation, was a 
pragmatic solution, securing physical survival of the nation. George F. Kenan, who was 
from September 1938 to early 1942 assigned to a US diplomatic post in Prague,80 shared 
this point of view. In his personal notes on the Munich crisis, written in early October 
1938, he considers that:  
Most importantly of all, it [Munich settlement] preserved for the exciting 
tasks of the future a magnificent young generation – disciplined, 
industrious, and physically fit – which would undoubtedly have been 
sacrificed if the solution had been the romantic one of hopeless resistance 
rather than the humiliating but truly heroic one of realism.81
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The restrained reaction of the Czechoslovak military leaders enabled that the 
social unrest was subdued by the police and, “by nightfall, the demonstrators went home, 
and the army, its raison d’être trampled into dust, began its painful retreat from the 
[frontier] fortresses.”T82T Obviously, the retreat without a fight was perceived as an 
enormous humiliation and embarrassment among the soldiers, including the highest 
commanders. This situation resulted in an incident, in which Czechoslovakia moved 
historically closest to a military coup d'état: 
As the German army moved, step by step, into the individual zones of the 
Sudeten territory, and the Czechoslovak soldiers prepared to withdraw 
from the zone which included the fortifications, a last attempt was made to 
stop avalanche. A group of generals, led by Krejčí, planned to take over 
the government and even arrest [president] Beneš. Some civilian leaders 
supported this plan. On October 3, four generals saw Beneš and, 
threatening to depose him if he refused, demanded his abdication. 
Allegedly, Beneš rejected the request, saying that he did not officially take 
cognizance of it, for if he did, he would have to punish the generals in his 
capacity as a supreme commander. The generals left, the plan aborted.T83T 
Nonetheless, this isolated incident in Czechoslovak civil-military relations should 
be rightly understood as an evidence of deep desperation among the Czechoslovak 
generals. President Beneš later described the situation this way: “I saw tears in the eyes of 
some of the generals, and I heard those saying words of plea, warning and threat. They 
never crossed the tolerable line of subordination to the supreme commander, though their 
pleas and warnings were strong.”T84T The fact that the rebelling generals neither had any 
sophisticated plan nor they resorted to violence against the president clearly demonstrates 
they had not been seriously determined to seize political power and the leadership of the 
nation. Instead, they obeyed the instruction from the government which resulted in a non-
violent solution of the crisis. As Pavel Šrámek mentions in his book, generals Syrový and 
Krejčí also visited the parliament on October 3, where Krejčí in his speech demanded 
formation of “an authoritative administration without political parties and parliament, and 
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he directly proposed its members,”85 but after this attempt also fell through the anti-
capitulation military junta quickly dissolved.  
Nevertheless, both the military and the civic society paid dire price for not 
defending the country, because, “the wounds (physical and psychological) caused by the 
Czechoslovak army’s failure to resist were as deep as maybe more treacherous than 
whatever injuries Czechoslovakia would have sustained in war against Germany.”86 
Czechoslovak public opinion negatively perceived that twenty years after gaining the 
independence, “nation lost it without firing a shot.”87 As a result, the prestige of the 
military as an institution was considerably low for the next several decades. The military 
only started getting back full respect among public in early 1990s, after Czechoslovak 
troops successfully participated in Gulf War I and the Balkans peacekeeping missions. 
Numerous Czechoslovak soldiers of all ranks felt personally responsible for removing the 
stain of Munich by fighting against Nazism anywhere; they emigrated and later fought 
bravely as volunteers on the fronts of World War II. Others were actively involved in the 
domestic resistance movement against Nazi occupation. Hence, even though “deprived of 
the chance to fight, and perhaps die, on the battlefield in the fall of 1938, many 
[Czechoslovak] officers found a way to resist the Third Reich nevertheless.”88
In summary, the performance of the Czechoslovak military especially during the 
last stage of the Munich crisis, which means after the acceptance of the Munich 
ultimatum by the Czechoslovak government, provides convincing evidence of fully 
consolidated civil-military relations. The fact that the military followed the guidelines 
from democratically elected civilian administration even if it was in sharp conflict with 
the morale principles and traditional values of the military professionals gives clear 
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B. COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN 1948 
The fact that for specific reasons the Czechoslovak military stayed neutral during 
the Czechoslovak governmental crisis in February 1948, which quickly escalated into “de 
facto” installation of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia, is a remarkable and 
specific case from the perspective of the theory of civil military relations. Czechoslovakia 
in the February crisis should be characterized as a state facing low external and high 
internal threats, a situation which, according to the theory, results in the worst civilian 
control of the military, thus it is also “making direct military intervention [a coup d'état] 
more likely.”89 The military non-intervention into civilian matters in time of a deep 
political turmoil provides evidence about deeply rooted traditions of civilian control in 
the Czechoslovak civil-military relations, in spite of the fact that after World War II the 
reconstructed Czechoslovak military officer corps was subjected to massive infiltration of 
communist cadres in 1945-48.90
Apart from its civil-military dimension, the crisis is unique in other ways, which 
consequently had significant impact on civil-military relations during the crisis. First of 
all, this is probably the only known case when the Communist seized power in 
accordance with democratic political principles; i.e. in a fully constitutional way. Another 
important aspect is that the crisis originated in a political action of democratic parties 
participating in then Czechoslovak government, which was the demission of twelve 
democratic ministers. Ironically, by waging this action these parties unintentionally 
prepared ideal conditions for the Communist takeover, which was, from the legal point of 
view in full accordance with the democratic constitution, although the Czechoslovak 
Communists certainly broke moral traditions of political culture by putting enormous 
pressure on the government and public by using biased propaganda and staging numerous 
demonstrations of mass power. Hence, in full accordance with the theory of the 
breakdown of democratic regimes presented by Linz and Stepan, the Czechoslovak 
communists embarked on seizing political power by combining a clandestine subversion 
with “a formally legal process of transfer of power. In that process the neutrality, if not 
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the cooperation of the armed forces or a sector of them has become [sic] decisive”91 for 
the success of their power-grabbing scheme. 
During the crisis, there was present a substantially viable external threat. As the 
crisis started unfolding, the Soviet leaders were inclined to intervene; particularly Stalin 
“pointedly suggested that [the Czechoslovak Communist leader and then the Prime 
Minister] Gottwald should ask the Soviet government for military assistance.”92 
However, the Czechoslovak communists did not venture to invite foreign troops into the 
country. Officially, Gottwald considered it unnecessary, “because the party was in full 
command of the situation, including armed forces, and that Soviet intervention would 
significantly complicate the power confrontation both domestically and 
internationally.”93  While the former sentence of his explanation sounds like a political 
boasting, because during the crisis the Communists did not have military under full 
control, as it will be explained further, the latter one most probably gives the right 
answer. If Soviets had intervened militarily in February 1948, it would have deprived the 
Czechoslovak Communists of the public support they had earned by their misleading 
propaganda and populist policy. Either way, the result was that the role of external factors 
in the crisis remained marginal.  
The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia needs to be understood in broader 
context of the European history. The whole process, leading to the crisis, actually started 
in the middle of World War II. After the impressive series of the Soviet victories in 1943-
44 and with the USA and Great Britain hesitating to open a second front in France, it 
started becoming clear that the post-war Czechoslovakia would be in the Soviet sphere of 
interest and its traditional diplomatic orientation on the West would have to be altered. 
The Czechoslovak president Beneš, in reaction to his negotiations with Soviet leaders and 
Czechoslovak Communists in December 1943, writes: “Is our [Czechoslovak] national 
culture Eastern or Western? And what inferences can be drawn from this? Indeed, our 
conduct during the war sometimes gave the West the impression that we are preparing to 
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change over from our former Western cultural orientation to a so-called Eastern one.” T94T 
After Czechoslovakia was reconstituted in the aftermath of the war, the political 
influence of the KSČ (Komunistická strana Československa – the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party) was much greater than before World War II. To explain this 
phenomenon one needs to understand, that after the six-year period of Nazi occupation 
and cruel oppression, “bitter memories of the betrayal by the West in 1938 and of the 
great economic depression of the 1930s pushed many to the left of the political 
spectrum.” T95T  
The Communists claimed it was necessary to have a strong and centralized 
government to control efficiently the post-war reconstruction of the country; therefore, in 
the years 1945-1948 Czechoslovakia was ruled by the government of national unity, so 
called “National Front”T96T, which was a joint platform of the Communist party and the 
democratic parties, and the Communists were gradually gaining dominance in it. 
Following the instructions from Moscow, they were concealedly placing party members 
and sympathizers into key government positions. Thus, “the communists [sic] were able 
to suppress noncommunist opposition, place party members in position of power, and 
create solid basis for a takeover attempt.’T97T  The democratic parties in the government 
vehemently protested this stealthy usurpation of power, but with little to no effect. 
Finally, on February 20, 1948, in protest of the Communist subversion, “the twelve 
noncommunist ministers resigned, in part, to induce Beneš to call for early elections; 
Communist losses were anticipated owing to popular disapproval of recent KSČ 
tactics.”T98T Their plan relied on the constitutional procedures, because “by resigning, they 
would precipitate a government crisis, the President would refuse to accept their 
resignation, but would declare the government incapable of performing its functions, and 
call for new elections.”T99T 
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Unfortunately, their plan was poorly conceived, so “this ill-timed drastic 
move…shocked Beneš, who had not been previously briefed.”100 Meanwhile, the 
Communists quickly seized the opportunity and started heavy campaign to force the 
president to accept the resignation and coopt a leftist government. In order to win public 
support they mobilized masses. As a tool of popular control of public assets, they 
organized so-called “action committees.” These, “Communist ‘action committees’ that 
had been formed ‘all over the country’ seized a number of ministries.”101 This action 
deprived the resigning democratic ministers from an access to their supporters within the 
governmental staff. 
Next, the Communists were also “organizing and equipping the workers’ militia, 
an auxiliary armed formation created by the Communist Party and directly subordinated 
to its Presidium.”102 Although these irregular armed units were not used in a violent way, 
the Communists skillfully used them in 1948 crisis to demonstrate their power and 
intimate their political opponents, as “the militia was not needed, but once armed, it was 
called out to give demonstration of its might before the citizenry of the capitol.”103   
On February 25, as another attempt to step up the pressure on the President, “a 
general strike was called to persuade Beneš to accept the moderates’ resignation.”104 The 
president was in a difficult position. “The democratic parties should have been prepared 
to give him the strongest possible moral support.”105 But instead, they remained 
frightened and passive. An important factor was the physical condition of President 
Beneš, because he had a stroke in the fall of 1947.106 Finally, on February 25, 1948 
President Beneš “accepted the resignations of the dissident ministers and received a new 
cabinet list from Gottwald, thus completing the communist takeover.”107 Within the new 
government, the Communist Party occupied all crucial seats and, “the remaining seats 
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were occupied by members of the non-Communist parties who were totally dependent 
on, and without exception subservient to, the Communists.”108  
In order to understand the position of the Czechoslovak military in the February 
crisis in the context, one has to understand how the military was reconstructed after 
Czechoslovakia was liberated from Nazi troops in May 1945. The nucleus of the newly 
formed military forces was based on the Czechoslovak units abroad, who had fought 
against fascists mostly in Great Britain and the Soviet Russia.109 Theoretically, the units 
returning from the West were supposed to create a balanced military structure with the 
units returning from the East. In reality, owing to the fact that the Red Army liberated 
major part of the Czechoslovak territory, “The governmental blueprint, the Košice 
Accord of April, 1945, granted the [Czechoslovak] communists and the U.S.S.R. broad 
influence in the recreation of the armed forces.”110 The Communist Party took full 
advantage from this extraordinary measure and used their influence to place officers 
coming from Russia into important posts. Moreover, “The First Army on the Territory of 
the U.S.S.R. was to form the core of the officer group….the air force, primarily housed in 
London, was to be next in importance [i.e. less important].”111 The truth is that the First 
Army Corps fought bravely on the East front since 1943 and it also successfully 
participated in the liberation of the Czechoslovak territory. In contrast with this, the 
Czechoslovak army in Great Britain stayed idle for most of the war, with the exception of 
its participation in low-intensity operations in the siege of Dunkirk from the end of 1944. 
Therefore, it could be easily justified that the new military structures should be primarily 
based on the battle-experienced troops of the First Army Corps.  The situation in the Air 
Force was completely different, since Czechoslovak airmen fought in World War II 
predominantly in the ranks of the British Royal Air Force; this explains why after the 
communist seized power in 1948, they concluded that “in the Czechoslovak Air Force at 
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least 80 out of every 100 officers and enlisted are politically ‘dubitable’ and those would 
hesitate to fight against the West.”T112T 
In spite of the massive Communist efforts to infiltrate officer corps and thus 
stealthy gain control over the military, the Czechoslovak military forces in 1948 were 
still, “essentially apolitical masses of troops, most of whose officers were traditionally 
non-political.”T113T General Hasal, who emigrated to the West on 2 July 1948, reveals that:  
From May 1945 the Soviets pressured Czechoslovak military leadership to 
reorganize the army and air force according to the Red Army standards. 
During the following three years Moscow was sending Soviet military 
experts to coordinate military cooperation between both military forces. 
But the project failed, which explains why the Soviet circles do not trust 
the Czechoslovak military.T114T  
The fact that the military leaders did not consider using the military to solve an 
internal crisis may be found in the attitude of the General Staff to the formulation of 
defense and security policy in January 1948: “For the moment, there is no threat, there is 
no need to act hastily, we can work with circumspection, consider what is possible and 
necessary.”T115T As the generals did not see any need for the military to stir internal 
politics, the Communist leaders could not count on military in their takeover plans. As a 
result of this development, there was a danger of an internal conflict inside the military, 
because “the military elite was still divided between pro-Soviet and pro-Western officers 
and the loyalty of the officer cadre was equally suspect in the eyes of the communists and 
of Beneš….[but] The armed forces remained neutral in the political crisis. The military 
role was usurped by the militia and the police.”T116T  
The Communist distrust for the military provides evidence that despite the 
prolonged and purposeful undermining of democratic principles in the military the KSČ 
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failed to subjugate the military. Nevertheless, the Communists were quite aware of the 
success of their constitutional coup required to control the security situation in the nation, 
because without it they could not secure their demagogic political campaign. For this 
reason, “the Communists concentrated their efforts on expanding their positions in the 
security apparatus and on monopolizing control over their two most important units, 
intelligence and State Security.”117 Even American materials, based on the reports from 
the American Embassy in Prague, confirm that “nonparticipation of the armed forces 
contrasted sharply with the openly pro-Communist role played by the police.”118
However, “The army’s neutrality cannot be dismissed as an unimportant factor in 
the communist rise to power.”119 The most accurate description is that in 1948 the 
Czechoslovak military was deceived and manipulated in a similar way as the 
Communists deceived and manipulated public opinion. Without a doubt, the armed forces 
were influenced by “the spectacular show of strength of the various pro-Communist mass 
organizations, who took to the streets to make know their point of view.”120 This 
circumstances seems be explaining why on February 23, “General Svoboda, the officially 
non-partisan but pro-Communist army commander, … on behalf of the army, made it 
clear that it would remain faithful to the people and not become the instrument of any 
individual or group of people.”121   
The simple truth is that the majority of the military commanders in 1948, 
including the top brass, were not conscious supporters of the Communist ideology; 
instead, they were deceived victims of the communist manipulation with facts, an art in 
which the Communists had traditionally been brilliant. This explanation is supported by 
the fact that, according to Rice, after the Communists consolidated their regime they 
decided to replace the professional officer corps with “politically acceptable” cadres, 
even if it was at the expense of expertise.122 During this period, which was called the 
 
117 Kaplan, 133. 
118 Walter Ullman, The United States in Prague, 1945-1948 (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 
distributed by New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 150. 
119 Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 55. 
120 Ullman, 149-50. 
121 Ibid., 150. 
122 Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 62. 
36 
                                                
formation of the ‘Army of a Socialist Type” and lasted from 1948 to 1956, most of the 
February 1948 highest ranking officers, including general Svoboda, were severely 
purged. Obviously, the Communist regime would not have purged them if these officers 
had been considered as true believers in Marxism-Leninism. 
The pressing question is why the military did not step in to save the democracy in 
Czechoslovakia.  The simple answer is the military did not get orders to do so and staging 
an internal security operation without proper orders was against all principles of the 
Czechoslovak military professionalism. In relation to this issue, it is necessary to question 
Condoleezza Rice’s explanation, that the failure of President Beneš to order the army to 
resist the communist takeover can be explained in terms of his doubt on the efficacy of 
such a solution, because of the strong communist infiltration of the military.123 It is 
necessary to understand that President Beneš was a politician of integrity, deeply devoted 
to democratic principles in political conduct, as he addressed this issue in his response to 
the letter of the Czechoslovak Communist party: “You know my deep democratic 
convictions. I cannot but remain faithful to it at this moment as in opinion democracy is 
the only solid and permanent basis for human life and honesty and dignity.”124 Given his 
negative experience with the use of force from the Munich crisis in 1938 and from the 
years of World War II, it was highly improbable that he would use the military to resolve 
a political crisis, which in its nature would be sharply undemocratic. This sis what the 
democratic parties involved in the 1948 crisis failed to grasp, as they relied too much on 
the President, because “they could not have foreseen that, even in this dispute, Beneš 
would not use his authority, and that as a supreme commander he would not use the 
army. However, neither his political thinking nor his recent behaviour [sic] gave them 
any cause to assume that he would.”125 Mr.Smutný, the President’s aide, who was staying 
close  to  him  in  February  crisis,  describes  it  bluntly:   “How  was  it  possible  for  the  
 
123 Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 55. 
124 Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948: The Failure of 
Coexistence (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 233. 
125 Kaplan, 178. 
37 
President to launch a counter-revolution against his own Prime Minister, who, with his 
own [party] people had succeeded without resistance in getting hold of all positions right 
of the first day?”T126T  
Some military theorists assert that instead of remaining neutral the military should 
have been deployed to crush the Communist takeover; these individuals are underscoring 
the Communist ability to manipulate the public opinion. In 1948 the Czechoslovak 
society was so polarized that any attempt to use a military force to resolve the February 
crisis would have inevitably resulted in a societal disarray, or maybe even in a civil war. 
Unfortunately, in February 1948 the Czechoslovak military could not do anything to 
prevent political developments leading to the forty years of the Communist dictatorship, 
unless it would have actually staged a military coup.  
On the whole, the resistance against all Communist attempts to cause internal 
political disintegration of the traditional military values is a remarkable achievement of 
the Czechoslovak military professionalism. This phenomenon can be credited to 
combined effect of many attributes of the Czechoslovak military culture. First of all, 
“there was greater continuity in the ‘new Czechoslovak army’ than in Poland or the Axis 
states.”T127T In other words, the professional traditions of the pre-war Czechoslovak 
military guided the soldiers to stay neutral to political campaigning and propaganda. 
Apparently, the Communists were wrong as they assumed that the Czechoslovak soldiers 
returning from the East would automatically become Communist supporters. On the 
contrary, many of these soldiers had a first hand experience with the practices of the 
KGB and political commissars, therefore they knew how cruel and oppressive the 
Stalin’s regime was against its own people. As a result, these servicemen stayed loyal to 
the democratically elected authorities and the KSČ could not count on them in February 
1948. Another aspect underscoring the negative attitude of Czechoslovak military 
officers toward the Communist ideology is the heritage of the Czechoslovak Legion in 
World  War  I.  The  traditions  of  negative experience from the fight against Bolsheviks  
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caused that “unlike the general Czechoslovak population, many members of the military 
[former legionaries] had been involved in bitter experience which involved Soviet 
military and political officers.”128  
In brief, by remaining neutral in February 1948 constitutional crisis, the 
Czechoslovak military demonstrated its loyalty to the civilian leaders, thus confirming 
deep traditions of the Czechoslovak military professionalism, regardless of all attempts to 
undermine it ideologically. The military could not be blamed for the fact that the 
Communists adroitly misused the military’s neutrality in their sneak political game. 
 
C. SOVIET-LEAD MILITARY INTERVENTION IN 1968 
The military intervention of five East-block countries in August 1968 is certainly 
the most complicated case of the four societal crises examined in this thesis. A unique 
feature of this crisis is the fact that the reforming process of the Marxist regime, which 
under no circumstances can be recognized as a serious internal crisis because the ruling 
Communist Party started and controlled the reforms that were widely supported across 
the society, was abruptly turned into a serious internal crisis by the surprising military 
intervention of the communist nations, allied with Czechoslovakia in the Warsaw Pact. 
Thus, the situation was actually similar to the developments during the 1938 crisis, 
because in 1968 the external threat was also quickly transformed into a severe internal 
threat, by causing civic disturbances and the split of society. The fact that the military 
complied with the orders from civilian leaders, with the exception of isolated incidents, 
shows strong civilian control of the Czechoslovak military in 1968 crisis.  
Under the conditions of the communist regime, the civil - military relations were 
deformed by strong party-military relations, and further complicated by the first and the 
second dimensional ties to the Soviet party and military structures (Fig.3), as explained in 
chapter two of this thesis. These exclusive relations, based to great extent on the standard 
operating procedures and the chain of command of the Warsaw Pact, and informal ties 
among top national commanders, provided the Soviet leadership with significant 
influence in Czechoslovak military matters. Nevertheless, via the party influence the 
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system secured an efficient civilian control of the Czechoslovak military, which was fully 
accepting the superiority of the political leadership, thus providing convincing evidence 
about strong civilian control. Hence, the Soviet failure to use the second dimension to 
direct the Czechoslovak military against its civilian leadership, i.e. the reform-promoting 
Communist party, provides another piece of evidence of the strong civilian control of the 
military. 
Raison d’ętre for the intervention was that the Soviet leadership was alarmed by 
“the reform movement of the late 1960s, popularly dubbed the ‘Prague Spring’ [which] 
was an effort mainly by the Czechs (with some Slovak support) to restructure Marxist-
Leninist socialism in a way more suitable to their respective historical, cultural, and 
economic circumstances.”T129T Concerning the civil-military relations, “the party and 
military were moving together toward reform and when the Soviets were unable to 
pressure the ČLA [Czechoslovak armed forces] elite directly, it was obvious that the 
rapprochement was at the expense of Soviet influence.”T130T 
As a result and based on the decision of the Soviet Communist Party Central 
Committee, on August 20, 1968 at 11 P.M. Czechoslovakia was invaded by the allied 
armies of the Warsaw Pact, with the exception of Rumania. Both the Czechoslovak 
military and political leaders were caught by surprise; therefore, “there was nobody to 
oppose or stop the overwhelmingly powerful thrust which engaged close to half a million 
troops.”T131T   
Facing the situation where invading troops were in the depth of the Czechoslovak 
territory, the government decided that military defense would be counterproductive and 
asked the citizens to stay out of any violent actions against the invaders. These 
instructions were issued in the form of the proclamation of the Presidium of the Central 
Committee, which says: “The presidium calls upon all citizens of the Republic to keep 
the peace and not resist the advancing armies, because the defense of our state borders is 
now impossible. For this reason, our Army, the security forces, and the People’s Militia 
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were not given orders to defend the country.”132  Thus, similar to the situation in the 
Munich crisis in 1938, “the Czechoslovak argument was subsequently that in the 
certainty of defeat no government has the right to sacrifice its people.”133 The political 
leadership of the country again selected realistic solution which raises delicate question 
of national honor vs. long term practicability; apparently the Czechoslovak politicians 
preferred the latter quality over the former one.134  
The proclamation in its consequences ruined the political plot to justify the 
intervention, as it was originally intended by Soviet ideologists. The original scenario 
was to quickly replace the reform government by a puppet regime, which would issue a 
state of emergency and ask the Warsaw pact for “fraternal assistance.”135  , a massive 
wave of popular protests started immediately after August 20, as “the Czechoslovak 
population was virtually unanimous in its repudiation of the Soviet action.”136 The 
protesters generally complied with the government insistence on not provoking violence, 
so they limited their actions to passive resistance and movement of non-cooperation with 
the occupants. Important attribute of this movement was non-cooperation of mass media 
employees, hence, “the Soviets found themselves in the extraordinary position of 
controlling the country militarily and being unable to give the Czechoslovaks their 
version of what they were doing there.”137  
Unable to set up a collaborating regime, the Soviets flew leading Czechoslovak 
politicians for talks in Moscow, which resulted in an agreement stating that: “the troops 
of the allied countries that temporarily entered the territory of Czechoslovakia will not 
interfere in the internal affairs….Agreement was reached on the terms of the withdrawal 
of these troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia, depending on the normalization of 
the situation in the Republic.”138 This vague formulation must be understood as a 
compromise, giving plenty of leeway to both sides. However, it was a remarkable 
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achievement that the Czechoslovak politicians, who were in a position of representatives 
of a conquered country, managed to maintain to significant degree their political freedom 
of decision.  
Nevertheless, behind the scene the Soviet leaders kept working fervently to 
remove the Czechoslovak reformists from the government and form a puppet government 
that would return Czechoslovakia on a Marxist path. Although they had ideal conditions 
under the occupation regime, they only succeeded after April 1969, when Gustav Husák 
assumed the post of the first secretary of the Communist Party and consequently, as 
David W. Paul states, “he presided over dismantling of the reforms and worked to re-
solidify his country’s ties with the Soviet Union.”T139T 
There has been a wide discussion whether Czechoslovakia should have fought in 
August 1968. The author and renowned Czechoslovak dissident Ivan Sviták believes that 
Czechoslovak military should have fought, even under desperately unfavorable 
conditions with the prospect that “the military resistance could not have lasted longer 
than several days and the consequences would have been similar to those in [1956] 
Hungary.” T140T The best answer is that the output of the crisis most probably would not 
have changed in case of the Czechoslovak armed resistance against the occupation, 
except that the whole process would have been bloodier.T141T  
The truth is that the Czechoslovak military was not ready to fight its allies, 
because all its military structure, communications and equipment was unified with the 
invading forces. A detail illustrating the point is the fact that all the military vehicles of 
invading armies were painted with a wide white stripe to distinguish them from the 
identical equipment used by the Czechoslovak military.T142T Another important factor is 
that the Czechoslovak military was only responsible for the protection of the border with 
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the non-socialist countries, i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria.143 
Therefore, all the combat units were based in southwestern Bohemia, and the border with 
“friendly” communist states was militarily unprotected, hence, “the thrust of the 
Czechoslovak military layout was pointing westwards for over twenty years and no 
intelligence activity, let alone manoeuvre, had ever been undertaken against a potential 
enemy in the East.”144
Furthermore, Czechoslovakia could not expect any tangible support from western 
democracies. The West was not ready to threaten the fragile strategic balance based on 
the East - West division of Europe in order to intervene in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
because “everybody knew there were ‘hot areas’ on both sides of the East-West divide 
which the opposite power considered off-limits.”145 Also, the United States under the 
Johnson administration was heavily involved in the Vietnam War and busy with solving 
internal disturbances.146 For this reasons, the western powers limited their support to 
formal denials of the intervention.  
Considering the overall impact of these circumstances it is right to assess that in 
contrast with the situation in Munich crisis in 1938, in 1968 there was not even a 
marginal chance that a military counteraction could have been successful. However, 
those Czechoslovak generals who were sympathetic to the anti-reform and pro-
intervention platform had strong incentives to stage a pro-Soviet military coup. Given the 
presence of the Soviet-led occupational troops in the country, such a coup would be a 
relatively ‘risk-free” venture, which would have solved the problem in a similar fashion 
like the Jaruzelski’s 1981 military coup in Poland. Obviously, under the situation when 
the story about invitation and the establishment of a puppet government failed, and the 
society remained hostile to the occupying forces, the Soviets would welcomed such a 
“solution,” resulting in their disengagement and allowing to present the crisis as an 
internal Czechoslovak matter.  
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In the aftermath of the invasion, the Czechoslovak military leaders got caught up 
in a peculiar position. According to Condoleezza Rice, the military leadership was caught 
“between two masters, the domestic liberalization which it did not dare to denounce and 
the Soviet party fury that it was unable and unwilling to do so.”T147T However, the fact that 
the generals were surprised by the invasion is a credit to their professionalism and respect 
to civilian control of the military. The renowned Czechoslovak historian Karel Kaplan, 
who emigrated from Czechoslovakia after 1968, claims that, “the military leadership was 
indeed uninformed and acted quite responsibly in the wake of invasion, informing the 
[Czechoslovak] political leadership of the progress and behavior of the allied troops.”T148T 
Another argument proving the loyalty of the military leaders is that “the Soviet reports on 
their reception upon entering Prague spoke only of friendly conversation with one captain 
and some unnamed soldiers. Either the Soviets were trying not to embarrass the 
leadership of the ČLA or really failed to obtain their support.”T149T, which is in sharp 
contrast with the activity of the security forces, therefore Rice is definitely right as she 
asserts: “whatever ‘internal’ assistance the Soviets received was probably offered by the 
security forces.”T150T Though, the second dimensional relations were still strong enough to 
provide the Soviets with additional influence in the Czechoslovak military matters. For 
example, when he was unable to get instructions from the Czechoslovak political 
leadership, the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense, Colonel-General Martin 
Dzúr, consulted during the initial stage of the invasion all his actions with the top Soviet 
civilian and military leadership,T151T but even he did not dare to disobey the Czechoslovak 
political representation. 
After the invasion the Czechoslovak military stayed neutral, but in reality it 
actively  participated  in  the  policy  of  passive  resistance,  which resulted in a situation  
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when, “during the first months after invasion, the ČLA leadership refused to ‘welcome’ 
the occupiers. Rather, the months after the invasion were marked by frantic attempts to 
adjust and to avoid confrontation.”T152T  
The KGB Report on the “Counterrevolutionary Underground” in Czechoslovakia 
from October 13, 1968 criticizes that although the Czechoslovak military stayed officially 
neutral in the crisis, there were many anti-Soviets incidents from individual units and 
soldiers.T153T Many commanders openly showed their negative sentiment about the 
occupation forces by refusing to provide them with support and publicly throwing out 
Soviet medals and banners. Individual soldiers frequently participated in anti-occupation 
demonstration.  On 23 August 1968 officers from the Central Military Command issued 
an open letter to the president, stating that:  
As Czechoslovak soldiers, we are bitterly outraged that we have to watch 
how our garrisons are being occupied. Orders that we receive force us to 
provide assistance to the occupying troops, which is in contrary with the 
attitude of our nation and our conscience. It bitterly outrages us that some 
of our party and political leaders are kept in custody. In case they are not 
immediately released, we expect, Mr. President, your order to protect our 
leaders by means of the Czechoslovak People’s Army. T154T   
The sharpest anti-intervention action happened when a group of generals from the 
Main Political Directorate under the leadership of Army General Václav Prchlík, made 
arrangements to start guerrilla struggle against the occupants,T155T but these attempts ended 
in vain, because the Czechoslovak politicians opposed violent protests. The truth is that 
General Prchlík represents an isolated figure amongst the Czechoslovak generals, 
because he was “the only military man in an important position who had suggested 
military defense as a possible action.”T156T But even Prchlík respected fully the superiority 
of the civilian leadership and he did not venture to any military action without a political 
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directive. Other generals chose less radical approaches, example of which is the letter of 
the General Staff Chief, General Karel Rusov, to the Soviet command warning that the 
occupation of military installations and blocking of the regular work of state institutions 
“creates a conflict-prone situation and leads to further escalation of already strenuous 
relations,”T157T which still shows their resentment and hostility towards ”allied” occupiers.   
The Soviets apparently did not trust the Czechoslovak military enough to inform 
at least some generals about their plans, which provides evidence about coherence and 
loyalty of the officer corps, as well as it proves a strong civilian control of the 
Czechoslovak military. Prior to the invasion the military successfully participated in the 
process of democratization, which resulted in the Memorandum of Scientific Workers in 
the Czechoslovak armed forces in May 1968 proclaiming that the Czechoslovak military 
doctrine had to be “the policy of a sovereign state contributing its own views to the 
formation of the common positions of the [Warsaw] alliance.” T158T   Therefore, “it took the 
Soviets almost a year to establish prohibitive control of the ČLA.” T159T During the months 
of occupation, in the military like in the society, “the failure to subdue Czechoslovakia 
politically for this extended period created a situation in which elements of the 
liberalization existed side by side with the conservative backlash which the invasion 
engendered. The era was thus marked by great heterogeneity in the leadership and in the 
society.”T160T In a similar fashion like in the February crisis in 1948, the military paid dire 
price for staying loyal to the political leadership during the following period of 
conservative communist resurgence, because “the gap between the military and the 
society widened even more after 1968 when the Czechoslovak armed forces were 
thoroughly purged by the Czechoslovak Communist Party and became even more tightly 
controlled by the Soviet Military Command. The Czechoslovak army became in fact a 
political scapegoat.”T161T 
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It took the Soviets almost two more years to fully subjugate the Czechoslovak 
society and its military to their hard-line Marxist ideology, by using step-by-step 
interventional approach “divide and rule.” Given the historic and political settings in 
1968, the movement of passive resistance and civic disobedience was probably the best 
answer to the invasion as any military action would have certainly resulted in a 
widespread bloodshed. While Soviets could not possibly lose militarily they definitely 
lost politically. A positive side-effect of the intervention was that it successfully 
eliminated pan-Slavonic friendly sentiment toward Russians within the Czechoslovak 
society.  As Paul observed in 1981, “Colonial nations generally do not love their masters, 
and it is safe to say that most Czech and Slovaks today greatly resent Russians.”162 This 
resentment was important for the future democratization movement, which started in mid 
1970s and culminated in the bloodless breakdown of the Communist regime in 1989. 
Unfortunately, this achievement was not priceless. In the popular resistance, about 70 
people died, and approximately 1000 were wounded in different incidents that occurred, 
as people massively participated in protest actions against the occupants.163  
In sum, “the occupation of Czechoslovakia by its allies was ironic and unique, 
even in the context of a long history of foreign occupations; enemies had invaded the 
Czech and Slovak lands many times before, but never friends.”164 Against the scenario, 
the Soviet leaders were not able to put across the message that the intervention was 
requested by Czechoslovakia. Under given historical circumstances, the fact that the 
Soviets failed to reach their goals in 1968 proves that strong professional traditions and 
professional respect to civilian authorities were still present in Czechoslovak military, 
even after twenty years of the totalitarian purges.  
 
D BREAKDOWN OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN 1989 
The so-called “Velvet” Revolution in 1989 stands for another pivotal moment of 
Czechoslovak history, when the Czechoslovak military fully cooperated with the 
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requirements of their civilian leaders; therefore, once again this crisis provides strong 
evidence of stable civil-military relations.  By overthrowing the Communist regime in 
peaceful demonstrations and strikes, the Czechoslovaks “have succeeded in changing the 
country from communism to a free society with a market economy – no more, no 
less.”165 Hence after the elections in 1990 Czechoslovakia could have its first completely 
non-communist government in over forty years.  
The 1989 political crisis shares some common features with the similar 1968 
events, as in both cases there was a deep internal political crisis stemming from the 
attempts to reform (in 1968) or to overthrow (in 1989) the ruling communist party. 
However, the Soviet influence on the Czechoslovak internal matters was less important 
than in 1968, because after the arrival of Michail Gorbachev’s reforms in 1987,166 the 
Soviet leaders were reluctant to intervene in these fields; hence, the Soviet influence in 
the crisis was marginal. In other words, in contrast with the 1968 crisis, the second 
dimensional party-military relations were significantly weaker in 1989, because for the 
Soviet Union “the traditional military solution, with a preceding coercive diplomacy, was 
out of question.”167 However, because “the gap between the military and the society 
widened even more after 1968 when the Czechoslovak armed forces were thoroughly 
purged by the Czechoslovak Communist Party,”168 the intra-state, first dimensional, 
relations were stronger in 1989 then in 1968, hence these relations played crucial role in 
the escalation of the serious political crisis, resulting in dramatic deterioration of civil-
military relations. 
During the initial stage of the “Velvet” revolution in 1989, which started as a 
spontaneous protest movement in response to brutal crackdown of the communist riot 
police on the first anti-regime demonstrations, “there was then a wide-spread fear that the 
army might be misused to suppress the liberal revolution. Although such tendencies were 
in fact present in the Supreme Command, the armed forces remained politically neutral 
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and eventually did not intervene.”T169T In fact, these concerns must have been legitimate, 
because “in communist-dominated Czechoslovakia the military was directed to fulfill two 
equally important functions: to defend the state against an external enemy and to protect 
the internal political status quo.” T170T 
At first, the communist leaders were considering to use the Party’s paramilitary 
units, the People’s Militia,T171T to suppress the mass demonstrations. This plan failed 
because the militia generally ignored the Communist Party’s orders for mobilization and 
eventual intervention against the demonstrators.T172T Hence, “the failure to mobilize the 
People’s Militia shifted the attention of the [Communist] Central Committee to the army 
as a possible means of preserving the party’s power.”T173T The armed forces were 
systematically being prepared for this kind of mission. In late 1989, i.e. right before to the 
revolution, there was there was a rehearsal for a military crackdown on civic 
disturbances; which was known under an action code-name “Intervention.” In the frame 
of this operation, “over 13,000 trained conscripts led by 79 officers and 155 tanks, had 
been prepared to deal with the demonstrations expected for the anniversary of the [1968] 
Soviet invasion in August [1989].”T174T This provides evidence of the tight Party control of 
the military. Following the Party orders, “the Czechoslovak General Staff of the 
Czechoslovak People’s Army completed on 23 November 1989 preparations for military 
crackdown on opposition centers and demonstrating citizens,”T175T so the military was 
ready to step into the political conflict. 
In the end, “the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party decided the 
following day to refrain from the use of military power and resolve the situation by 
‘political means.’”T176T The most probable explanation for this decision seems to be the 
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fact that “the regime had so decayed that it was unable to rely on even on the central 
security organs that had kept it in power for so long,”177 as it was consequently indicated 
by the further course of the revolution. Either way, “the military option was narrowly 
defeated in the Central [Communist] Committee,”178 so the military was supposed to stay 
in barracks. 
This development of the crisis was particularly unfavorable for the Czechoslovak 
generals. The Communist Party learned its lesson from the 1948 and 1968, when many 
general officers turned out to be hostile to communist ideology and after severe purges 
most of the generals in 1989 were communist hardliners. For these discredited officials, 
personified by the Minister of Defense Milan Václavík, it was of paramount importance 
that the Communist Party would remain in power, because otherwise their careers would 
be certainly endangered by any kind of democratization.  
Apart from having sufficient incentives to intervene into politics, the 
Czechoslovak generals also had enough power to stage a coup. Although the communist 
leaders voluntarily succumbed to a peaceful solution, “the final pillar of Communist 
power, the army, was … prepared to intervene for a time.”179 Also, “one reason [to stage 
an anti-democratization coup] relates to the basic fear among the officer corps that the 
new civilian state officials would immediately launch a widespread purge of the military 
as punishment for the army’s role in upholding the previous regime (as happened in 
Argentina in 1983-1984).”180 The fact that “such fears must have been on the minds of 
many officers”181 created favorable conditions for a military coup, as the coup-staging 
generals would have easily found a support within their subordinated military units.  
The military leadership also knew that their window of opportunity to a military 
coup was rapidly closing, because shortly after November 17, 1989 the movement of 
popular resistance against the communist regime, led by the Civic Forum (CF) 
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movement, started spreading among the Czechoslovak servicemen. This process resulted 
in a situation when “branches of Military Forum, modeled on CF … supported one of the 
students’ demands calling for a reduction in the length of military service. The 
consequences of this implied threat to discipline disconcerted the minister of defense, 
Milan Václavík, who proposed a military solution at the CPC plenum on Friday, 
November 24.” T182T These developments were going on under conditions when “doubtless, 
armed force was seriously contemplated in the first week [after November 17, 1989], 
partly as a last refuge of the desperate members of the [Communist] Central 
Committee,” T183T so in case of a military coup d'état, the generals could count on the 
support of the highest ranking Party cadres. In addition, “the most substantial reason and 
one that might led the officer corps to unite in favor of intervention relates to the 
military’s institutional role as the final guarantor of the security of the state. In this sense, 
open talk from the Civic Forum about a rapid Czechoslovak withdrawal from the Warsaw 
Pact would have seemed irresponsible to the Czechoslovak military.”T184T For all these 
reasons, the Czechoslovak military leaders undoubtedly had a very strong motivation to 
seize the political power and, by the same token, they understood they had very little time 
to make the decision. 
The final output of the efforts to use a military coup to reverse the political 
progress was a series of diffident attempts to deploy military units into the streets. For 
example, “conscript infantrymen in two regiments, kept on standby in Plzeň and 
Pardubice [within the operational range from the capitol], were denied access to 
television and newspapers, received no visits, and were confined to barracks.” T185T 
Obviously, this “attempt to insulate these soldiers from the outside world betrayed the 
high command’s fear that they might have developed a sense of common cause with 
[revolutionary] students,” T186T had only one purpose – to keep them ready for the 
intervention. Wheaton and Kavan refer in their writing to columns of tanks in the vicinity 
of the capital Prague and troops that were bused to the capital from the country “with 
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orders to attack and clear the [revolutionary] student occupied facilities on the night of 
November 21 to 22 [1989].”187 All these, clearly desperate, attempts were poorly 
prepared and ill conceived. In the end, the troops “spent the night in their buses in 
subfreezing temperatures and were grateful for the constant supplies of soup and hot 
drinks delivered by [revolutionary] students. Other units had appeared at factory gates in 
the suburbs but had been given no further orders.”188  Apparently, the Czechoslovak 
highest ranking military officers had no courage to assume responsibility and take over 
the political power. The most obvious explanation for this fact seems to be that even if 
they were subjects of a massive ideological indoctrination, the military leaders did not go 
against the principles of the professional military ethics. Thus, without the guidance from 
the leadership, the preparations for a possible military intervention internally collapsed.     
Consequently, after the victory of democracy was secured, the Czechoslovak 
military leaders tried to interpret the preparations for a military intervention as regular 
training activities. Nevertheless, they failed and shortly afterwards all Czechoslovak 
general officers, who were compromised by their participation in these preparations, were 
promptly dismissed or resigned voluntarily, including the Minister of Defense. However, 
the situation was different at lower levels of the chain of command. As late as on 22 
January 1990, there was reported “a widespread disillusionment in many military 
installations, coming from the feeling that ‘the OF [Civic Forum] does not protect the 
interests of enlisted soldiers and that ‘political commissars’ were not fired but only 
transferred to other jobs.”189 Nevertheless, the democratization of military as an 
institution was irreversibly on the right path. 
The most plausible explanation why the Czechoslovak military backed down from 
its planned intervention into politics seems to be a strong civilian control of the 
Czechoslovak military in 1989. It is necessary to keep in mind that prior to 1989 “all 
important decisions related to defense and the military were made by the professional 
apparatus of the Czechoslovak Communist Party…. In spite of the importance attributed 
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to the armed forces by the Communist Party the professional military could only very 
modestly influence key decisions on defense issues.”190 The truth is it was quite common 
in these times that flag officers were members of the highest communist decision-making 
bodies; in fact, the Party membership was a necessary prerequisite of becoming a general 
officer and the Communist Party apparatus incorporated all high military commanders. 
However, their position was not strong enough; hence “the top brass’s influence on 
civilian state leadership had been also negligible.”191 In other words, the first 
dimensional Party-military ties were efficiently substituting for what was supposed to be 
a democratic civilian control of the military. 
However, the danger of a military coup should not be underestimated. Apparently, 
the communist leadership learned the lesson from its unsuccessful attempts to control 
military in 1948 and the passive resistance of the Czechoslovak military to Communist 
hardliners in 1968. Ideological indoctrination of the officer corps was enormous in the 
decade before 1989, so the military was fully under the influence of the Communist 
ideology. On the other hand, “it is notable that communist party membership proved not 
to be the factor determining the allegiance of the officer corps. The fact that 82 percent of 
professional soldiers were party members did not prevent the army from acquiescing in 
the transition and, indeed, securing it.”192 Apparently, the Czechoslovak officer corps 
adopted the communist ideology only formally; in fact majority of the officers remained 
allegiant to their professional ethos. The continued primary allegiance of military 
officers-citizens to the state was first recognized by Valtr Komarek, a deputy premier in 
the first non-communist government, who proclaimed that “the politicization of the army 
must not be underestimated, but basically they [military officers] are citizens who were 
put in uniforms and have children and families. Many young people who demonstrated in 
the days of November [1989] were sons and daughters of officers.”193   
Most probably, a military coup could have succeeded, although it is questionable 
whether such a military intervention could reverse the overall societal advancement. 
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Apparently, the leaders of the new democratic opposition were quite aware of this fact. 
The CF leader, Václav Havel, who later became the first non-communist president after 
forty years of the totalitarian regime, “subsequently [in October 1990] expressed his and 
nation’s gratitude to General Miroslav Vacek, the outgoing chief of staff [and Václavík’s 
successor], for not resorting to force during the crisis,”194 which would have clearly 
escalated the crisis into new dimensions.\This leads to a general conclusion that “in any 
event, the [new] army leadership, represented by Mr. Vacek, demonstrated a good 
measure of an internalized professional military service ethic….In December 1989 some 
of the ‘politicized’ officers tried to stir up the military against the new government, but 
Vacek claimed to have put an immediate end to such actions.”195 Hence, the political 
process was reflected in the military as an internal struggle between coup-prone 
communist hardliners and real military professionals. Luckily for Czechoslovakia, the 
latter group prevailed.   
After considering all aspects of the 1989 crisis the most accurate conclusion 
seems to be that there was probability of a military coup d'état, as the Czechoslovak 
generals had personal stakes in preservation of the ruling communist regime. They also 
possessed sufficient powers to stage a coup. The fact that the Czechoslovak military, 
which was seriously ideologically indoctrinated, withdrew from the original preparations 
for military intervention without any significant incident and let the political players to 
settle the crisis, even if for the most of then highest ranking officers this meant the end of 
their military careers, gives another piece of evidence of a traditionally strong civilian 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
After analyzing in detail the civil-military relation in the most serious crises of 
the Czechoslovak history, the most appropriate conclusion is that even in these most 
critical moments the Czechoslovak military demonstrated exceptional loyalty to its 
political leadership, even if it was sometimes at the expense of the prestige of military as 
a trusted institution within the society.  A few isolated civil-military incidents should be 
understood as desperate attempts of individual patriotic officers to save the nation, 
without considering wider context of their actions. None of these incidents ever 
developed into a serious breach of harmonious civil-military relations. Hence, in 
accordance with the Huntington’s theory of ideal civil-military relations, the study 
presented in this thesis apparently confirms that a strong military professionalism, 
typified by the bonds of traditions, obedience, and patriotic loyalty, plays crucial role in 
determining the final state of civil-military relations, that is an objective civilian control 
of the military. 
Although the Huntington’s model has been recently challenged, among others, by 
an alternative agency theory presented by Peter D. Feaver, it still appears to be the most 
suitable theoretical model for the Czechoslovak case. Agency theory may be relevant for 
the interpretation of the latest developments in the U.S. civil-military relations, as this 
theory “treats civil-military relations as a special case of the more general phenomenon of 
political principals [i.e. political leaders] seeking to monitor and influence the behavior of 
their political agents [i.e. military].”196 Feaver uses this approach to explain the alleged 
ideological gap between the U.S. society and its military. However, in the history of the 
Czechoslovak and Czech civil-military relations, there has never been any ideological 
gap between a conservative military and a liberal society. This fact may be explained by a 
different ideological character of the Czechoslovak (Czech) military culture. The 
Czechoslovak (Czech) traditions, which started with the establishment of the 
Czechoslovak legions in World War I, has always been based on civic principles, as 
described in Chapter II. Therefore, the Czechoslovak (Czech) military professionalism 
has been increasingly based on a professional culture of civil servants and as such it 
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seems to be more important then the relationship principal-agent. Apart from that the 
Czechoslovak and Czech society has traditionally been ideologically stable; if there were 
ideological changes, like the 40-year communist experiment, then the majority of the 
society, including the military, accepted the change. The most suitable explanation for 
this fact may be found in the words of the current Czech president, Václav Klaus. His 
comments on the ideological background of the Velvet revolution in 1989 can be 
generalized to the overall characteristics of the Czechoslovak (Czech) approach to 
ideological issues: 
Our approach was undoubtedly influenced by the traditional Czech 
pragmatism and realism: by our strong democratic, nonaristocratic, almost 
plebeian traditions; by our evident lack of heroism; by our disbelief in 
authority, strong words, and formal gestures; and finally by uncertainty 
about our national identity, which had been lost, taken, or questioned so 
many times in the past.197   
This thesis purposely omits less-important incidents in the Czechoslovak civil-
military relations, i.e. so-called “Šejna’s affair” of 1967, the alleged coup preparations of 
1926, and the so-called Židenice incidents, which happened on the night of 21-22 January 
1933. Maj. Gen. Šejna, upon immigrating to the USA in 1968 where he could express 
himself freely, denied that “a coup was planned and such a plan has never been 
conclusively proven.”198 The other two incidents are connected to the controversial 
personality of Radola Gajda, a former Czechoslovak General and the leader of the Czech 
fascists. Radola Gajda was often characterized by his contemporaries as an ambitious 
adventurer, who ”may have been effective as a front line soldier, but he lacked the 
temperament and intellect to be an effective politician.”199 This seems to be explaining 
why both fascist coup attempts were poorly prepared and ended up in farce-style clashes, 
which could not seriously threaten the political status-quo. Overall, “the Czech fascists 
were simply never unified enough nor possessed enough popular support to pose a 
serious threat to the government.”200 Besides, the Czechoslovak military turned out to be 
resilient to fascist infiltration, which provides additional evidence of the strong military 
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professionalism. This way, the Czechoslovak civil-military relations resembled the 
situation in neighboring Germany right after Hitler seized political power in 1933, when 
the Reichswehr’s professional officers “had serious reservations about Nazis’ rowdy, 
anarchistic behavior, their undisguised contempt for the law, the terrorism of the SA and 
last but not least, the personage of the Führer himself,”201 so it took a couple of years 
until the German military fully succumbed to the Nazi rule. Fortunately for the 
Czechoslovak civil-military relations, the fascist movement in Czechoslovakia was not 
able to copy the Nazi scheme and get into power by political means. 
As it was said in the introduction, this thesis intentionally does not examine the 
impact of the Czechoslovak military professionalism on the Slovak civil-military 
relations. Owing to the fact that “in the aftermath of the [1993] divorce, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia have reached different conclusions regarding regional 
security,”202 in addition to the challenging need “to accommodate the specific interests of 
ethnic minorities to Slovak national interests, and to incorporate them into Slovak state 
interests,”203 the Slovak case seems to be significantly more convoluted; hence, to 
evaluate the importance of Czechoslovak civil-military traditions would require a 
comprehensive analysis which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this area 
seems to be offering the most obvious opportunity for future research, especially after 
both nations has converged in NATO and the EU. As a matter of fact, it could be also 
useful to make similar studies for other central European nations, which should 
consequently enable to accomplish a more general comparative analysis of the whole 
region, because all militaries in the region “have already undergone comprehensive 
reforms….the depoliticization of the armed forces did not encounter any major problems 
in these states.”204 Such a research should be desirable in order to explore common 
patterns in the relationship between military professionalism and civil-military relations. 
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In turn, this scheme would as well provide a good opportunity to validate the 
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